### K – Hierarchy [2:15]

Your framing turns your own method since ranking oppression leads to struggle between different groups and even leads certain groups to join the privileged in oppressing others, **McDonald and Coleman 1:**  
Peter McDonald and Mikki Coleman, Deconstructing hierarchies of oppression and adopting a 'multiple model' approach to anti-oppressive practice. Social Work Education serial online. March 1999;18(1):19. RC

The competition between the members of oppressed groups for what they might perceive as a strictly limited supply of essential resources has some particularly unpleasant and dangerous side-effects. **Groups which have suffered** long histories ofoppression **can** in turn use whatever power or influence they may have to **discriminate against** members of **other[s]** oppressed socialgroups, **believing their own concerns to be most important.** Alternatively, people who have been **[the] oppressed might**, consciously or unconsciously, **absorb the values and beliefs of their oppressors**. This may lead to ‘internalised oppression’, whereby members of oppressed groups may come to believe that the stereotypes, misinformation or propaganda being spread about their group are true (or partly true), so that they may develop low self-esteem, or they may behave in ways that are essentially consistent with their social stereotypes. Members of oppressed **groups might even compete** with other[s] oppressed groups **over which** of them **is most oppressed** and which of them is least oppressed, **creating** yet **another hierarchy** while fighting for the moral high ground. Members of one oppressed group may have attitudes or behave in ways which oppress members of other groups: When you’re on the bottom of a pile of **oppressed peoples**, a community **will look for a scapegoat**, usually a minority to oppress; this somehow makes the oppressed feel better, boosting the ego. **That community will** also **join with other[s]** communities **to oppress with more force.** This will cross race, gender, class and ability. **Black will join with white**, able-bodied with disabled, men with women **to oppress those** who **they feel** are different or feel **threatened by.**

You read evidence that says….. [reference their framing ev]

But attempts to prioritize forms of oppression are just tools by the oppressors to divide and rule the rest of society, **McDonald and Coleman 2:**  
Peter McDonald and Mikki Coleman, Deconstructing hierarchies of oppression and adopting a 'multiple model' approach to anti-oppressive practice. Social Work Education serial online. March 1999;18(1):19. RC

By definition, **the privileged** groups ithin a hierarchy **tend**s **to have the maximum access to** necessary commodities, as well as **political power** and social status. Those at the lower levels of the pyramid must either conform to the rules and desires of those at the highest point, in exchange for a given share of the society’s resources; or else those at the lower levels must engage in a constant struggle with those at the very base of the pyramid for whatever resources are left in society after the privileged group have taken the majority share. In fact, **it** i**s in the interest**s **of those at the top** of the hierarchy **to allow (or** actively to **encourage)** a certain amount of social **conflict** between those at the lower levels, and those at the base. **While** the mass of **people** below can be encouraged to **fight amongst themselves, rather than uniting** for a common cause, **the privileged** group **can** more **easily maintain their position** at the top of the hierarchy, as Freire asserted under a heading specifically entitled ‘Divide and Rule’: This is another fundamental dimension of the theory of oppressive action which is as old as oppression itself. As the oppressor minority subordinates and dominates the majority, it must divide it and keep it divided in order to remain in power. The minority cannot permit itself the luxury of tolerating the unification of the people, which would undoubtedly signify a serious threat to their own hegemony. Accordingly, **the oppressors** halt by any means (including violence) any action which in even incipient fashion could awaken the oppressed to the need for unity. Concepts such as unity, organization and struggle are immediately labelled as dangerous. In fact, of course, these concepts are dangerous-to the oppressors-for their realization is necessary to actions of liberation. It is in the interest of the oppressor to **weaken the oppressed** still further, to **isolate them**, to **create and deepen rifts among them.** This is done by varied means, from the repressive methods of the government bureaucracy, to the forms of cultural action with which **they manipulate the people by giving them the impression that they are being helped.**  
Means you have no solvency – plans such as yours are just tools used by the dominant in society to maintain broader control while glossing over deeper issues, so you garner no offense. Your advocacy also ignores that banning guns for white people leaves a whole spectrum of marginalized populations defenseless – for example, the disabled, **TLC:**

http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hatecrimes/disabilities.html

Bias against people with disabilities takes many forms, often resulting in discriminatory actions in employment, housing, and public accommodations. **Disability bias can** also **manifest** itself **in the form of violence** — and it is imperative that a message be sent to our country that these acts of bias motivated hatred are not acceptable in our society. **Numerous** disability and criminology **studies**, over many years, **indicate a high crime rate against people with disabilities.** However, the U.S. Office on Crime Statistics reported in 2002 that in many cases, crime victims with disabilities have never participated in the criminal justice process, "even if they have been repeatedly and brutally victimized." There are a number of challenges for disability-based hate crime reporting. For instance, **hate crimes against people with disabilities are often never reported** to law enforcement agencies. The victim may be ashamed, afraid of retaliation, or afraid of not being believed. The victim may be reliant on a caregiver or other third party to report the crime, who fails to do so. Or, the crime may be reported, but there may be no reporting of the victim's disability, especially in cases where the victim has an invisible disability that they themselves do not divulge. Perhaps the biggest reason for underreporting of disability-based hate crimes is that **disability-based bias crimes are all too frequently mislabeled** as "abuse" and never directed from the social service or education systems to the criminal justice system. Even very serious crimes — including rape, assault, and vandalism — are too-frequently labeled "abuse." In one of the few disability-bias cases successfully prosecuted, in 1999, Eric Krochmaluk, a man with cognitive disabilities from Middletown, N.J., was kidnapped, choked, beaten, burned with cigarettes, taped to a chair, his eyebrows shaved, and ultimately abandoned in a forest. Eight people were subsequently indicted for this hate crime — making this one of the first prosecutions of a disability-based hate crime in America. The special problems associated with investigating and prosecuting hate violence against someone with a disability makes the availability of federal resources for state and local authorities all that much more important to ensure that justice prevails. To address this need, the pending Local Law Enforcement Hate Crime Prevention Act (LLEHCPA), discussed below, will expand existing federal criminal civil rights protections to include disability-based hate crimes.

For disabled people, guns are a key equalizer and handguns are uniquely key since many disabled people cannot use other guns, **Boyles**, a disabled person with mobility issues, writes:

https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/disability-self-defense-and-concealed-carry/

What choices of weapons are available to me as a disabled person? Typically, a chemical spray (containing tear gas, a combination of tear gas and pepper spray, or pepper spray alone), a Taser (with a clean background check), a stun gun, or a firearm. The legality of each of the items listed varies by state and locality. Massad Ayoob, an expert in the use of firearms for law enforcement and self-defense, sums up the choices this way: “**Guns are the only weapons that put a physically small or weak person at parity with a powerful**, very possibly armed, **criminal.” That leaves a firearm as the most practical choice for a person with a disability.** As with any of the above self-defense choices, hopefully, a person (especially a disabled person) can discharge the weapon accurately and effectively to avoid either being disarmed or attacked by the assailant. Fortunately, I have never had to find out. A disabled person will have more problems choosing a firearm than a non-disabled person. For example, **in my situation, it would be impossible for me to use a shotgun to defend myself** inside my own home. **I have four fused discs in my neck. I would not be able to tolerate the recoil from a shotgun, so I must use a handgun instead.** The questions I had to ask myself in selecting a handgun were:

Regarding the state – more people than just blacks face police profiling and violence – and every reason why you say the aff empowers blacks is a reason it leaves others vulnerable, **Disabled World:**

http://www.disabled-world.com/editorials/cops.php

**People who experience** forms of developmental or mental **disabilities are** often times **doubly targeted by police violence** due to high rates of poverty and homelessness. **The brutal murder of a homeless man with schizophrenia in Fullerton, California presents what happens when homelessness, mental illness, and police brutality meet.** Kelly Thomas was sleeping on the streets when he was murdered; he was approached by six police officers in July of 2011. People who are homeless often face police harassment and unwarranted arrests. When Kelly allegedly refused to comply with his arrest two police officers held him down while four more police officers took turns beating him with their batons and stunning him with tasers for eight minutes. The beating left Kelly comatose and disfigured - he died less than a week afterward. September of 2011 found Miami police officers murdering 57 year old Ernest Vassell after he refused to give them his toy gun. Ernest experienced autism and lived with his family in their neighborhood, yet when the police saw him walking down the street with a toy rifle they started shouting at him to put down the, 'weapon.' Ernest was scared and confused by the police officers and hesitated just long enough for those police officers to shoot and kill him. To be plain, very little information is collected on a national level concerning police injuring and killing of people with disabilities. The problem comes from a larger failure to gather information on a national basis about police injuring and killing civilians as a whole. **Police departments either do not collect, or are reluctant to collect, this kind of information.** Reports of police injuring and killing civilians are scattered and imprecise. The Bureau of Justice Statistics surveyed 6,000 people and based on extrapolations of the information estimated that around 500,000 people every year are, 'hit, held, pushed, choked, threatened with a flashlight, threatened or sprayed with pepper spray, threatened with a gun or other form of force,' by police. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports states that around 300, 'justified homicides,' happen every year, yet does not record police killings considered to be unjustified. In the introduction to, 'Stolen Lives,' it is noted, 'many police killings result from 911 calls for help. A mother or father in a family crisis had no expectation when they dialed 911 that their overwrought or suicidal child would be killed by the very agency they called for help. Many victims had no idea they were being confronted by law enforcement agents when plainclothes or undercover police stormed into their homes or communities.' A number of shooting deaths appear to involve people who were suicidal. There are two distinct patterns in these situations that should not be confused. The first on is, 'suicide by cop,' and involves a person who is suicidal that points a weapon (many times unloaded) at a police officer with the intention of getting the police officer to shoot them. Often times the person with ask or even beg the police officer to shoot them, or a suicide note will make it clear what the person intended. The second pattern involves people who are suicidal that are killed by police yet have not threatened the police. In one instance, a person said he was suicidal and took 18 pills. They do involve a person who is clearly deeply distressed, at times has a weapon that is usually aimed at themselves or no one in particular. The presence of a weapon; however, is an important component in why many people have been killed by police officers - even if they were shot while wielding things such as bottles, shovels, scissors, or brooms. In many instances, police officers who kill or injure people with psychiatric disabilities do not act alone, they are in the company of other police officers. Courts have held that police officers in certain circumstances have a duty to intervene and protect people from excessive force by other police officers. Yet in order to prevail in a failure to protect case, the plaintiff must first establish that the police treatment was a violation from which they had the right to be protected.

The alternative is to reject the aff’s prioritization of particular forms of oppression as the “root cause” or more important for our actions to focus on since that retrenches the mindset of the oppressor, **McDonald and Coleman 3:**

Peter McDonald and Mikki Coleman, Deconstructing hierarchies of oppression and adopting a 'multiple model' approach to anti-oppressive practice. Social Work Education serial online. March 1999;18(1):19. RC  
Having deconstructed **‘hierarchies of oppression’** and established that any credence given to their acceptability **can only be a destructive force**, it follows therefore that their inverse, ‘hierarchies of oppressive experiences’, i.e. **‘my oppression is** worse/**more important** than your oppression’, **can only be** similarly **counter-productive** to anti-oppressive practices and goals, and that therefore: **there should be** no perceived hierarchy of oppressive experiences but **a recognition of the cumulative effect of** racism, sexism and disablist practices (Stuart, 1992) as **different forms of oppression** are **not** lived out separately or **in a hierarchical structure.** (Begum, 1994, pp. 17-18) Richie suggests that giving credence to a ‘hierarchy of oppressions’ can only ‘lead people to dangerous places’ (Richie, 1996a). If it can be argued that all forms of oppression are dehumanising and therefore unacceptable, it then becomes as meaningless to speculate who is either more oppressed or less oppressed, as it would be to give consideration to concepts of being ‘a bit pregnant’ or ‘very dead’. Any speculation of ‘how much?’, in relation to another individual or group, becomes a fatuous notion in all instances. People are either pregnant or not, dead or not dead, oppressed or not oppressed, and it is oppression itself in all its forms that must be challenged. Thus, ultimately, **any** theoretical **framework which** reifies the **accept[s]**ability of a  **hierarchy, whereby one form of oppression is deemed** more acceptable, or **less unacceptable**, **than another form**, can be said to **collude[s] with supremacist thinking which seeks to rationalize dominance and marginalisation** of one oppressed group in relation to another.

To clarify, my argument is not all forms of oppression are the same, but when you rank oppression, it only strengthens the oppressors and leads to further suffering.

### T/Theory

A. [insert interp here]

B.

C.

D. Fairness is a voter since debate’s a competitive activity with wins and losses and you can’t award the better debater a win if the round is skewed.

competing interps

Drop the debater

**Fairness comes first**:

1. It precludes knowing who won a layer. Massey et al:

“Pre-Fiat Arguments” [same author quals] Emily Massey, Grant Reiter, Geoff Kristof 2/3/14 http://nsdupdate.com/2014/02/03/pre-fiat-arguments-by-emily-massey-grant-reiter-and-geoff-kristof/

Third, pre-fiat debaters claim that their impacts precede fairness. To see what’s wrong with this, we need just to remember why fairness matters in debate in the first place. **Fairness constrains substance since abuse skews the judge’s evaluation of who did the better debating on the substantive layer. It constrains pre-fiat impacts for** exactly **the same reason. Even if the better debater is the person who resists oppression the most, abuse skews the judge’s evaluation of who did** the better debating on **that** pre-fiat layer.

2. No impact to critical education – I can gain education and learn about a particular role of the ballot out of round but fairness is a necessary practice that must be practiced within rounds.

3. A fair [and topical] version of your [K/aff] solves my impacts cause you’re predictable and equitable as well as 99% of your impacts since we’ll still get good discussion relating to [Y]. All you had to do is [meet my interp by X].

4. Inclusivity: an unfair model of debate kills the incentive for people to debate in the first place. That link turns all their offense since there’s no incentive to do work, read and come to tournaments to learn anything. **Speice and Lyle**[[1]](#footnote-1)

As with any game or sport, creating a level playing field that afford[ing]s each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted toward one particular competitor, the other[s] participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” Debate simply wouldn’t be fun if the outcome was pre-determined and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular team did. TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants.

5. Legitimacy – if debates aren’t fair debaters won’t think that K debate is legitimate since they’ll think it of as merely an exclusionary move rather than a real, substantive, intellectual decision making issue. Thus, unfairness undermines the education argument out of the role of the ballot.

6. Reading unfair and nontopical AC’s only incentivizes avoiding the substance of the aff. Lots of judges find T against such strategies largely legitimate and the argument does have a stronger link. But if the aff is reasonably topical then frivolous arguments just look stupid and debaters are more likely to talk about liberating oppressed groups.

### DA – Federalism

#### Link – CX clarifies – the plan is passed by the USFG.

#### The Second Amendment was designed to limit FEDERAL power – but the aff strips STATES of their power- ABA 08:

BRIEF FOR NEW YORK, HAWAII, MARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS, NEW JERSEY, AND PUERTO RICO, January, 11, 2008, DC. V Heller http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced\_preview\_briefs\_pdfs\_07\_08\_07\_290\_PetitionerAmCu6USStates.authcheckdam.pdf

As this Court, the lower federal courts, and the state courts have consistently and correctly stated for more than a century, the Second Amendment has no application to state laws. This Court so held more than a century ago, and there is no reason for it to change course now. **The Second Amendment was** drafted and **ratified to ensure** that **the federal government would not disarm state militias and** thereby **strip** States of a critical component of **their** reserved **sovereignty**. It was intended 2 to protect state sovereignty by restricting the federal government’s ability to regulate gun ownership in ways that would interfere with state militias. **To transform the Second Amendment into a limitation on** the police power of **the States,** **thus reducing state autonomy** vis-a-vis the federal government and the federal courts, **would** dramatically **alter the Amendment’s** **meaning** **and turn its federalism-grounded purpose on its head**. Moreover, the settled constitutional understanding of this point is consistent with numerous other decisions of this Court recognizing that the Framers left the primary responsibility for firearms regulation with the States.

**To clarify I do not endorse the constitution I just recognize that the aff has disastrous political results. States historically and currently regulate guns, Wood 15**

#### Robert H. Wood (current attorney in Florida), "A History of Firearms Legislation at the State and Local Levels," December 2015 AZ The foregoing amply demonstrates that throughout the history of the United States, it is the states who have been the primary regulators of firearms, in conformity with the Constitution’s original limitations on the powers of the federal government. While the federal government has enacted some laws to alleviate what could legitimately be considered national problems, the states continue to make localized choices on issues such as concealed carry, waiting periods, permitting, purchase frequency, assault weapons, and possession in sensitive areas. Therefore, the right to bear arms in the United States appears to be alive and well.

#### Gun control legislature is a key feature of federalism that needs to be the states’ power, O’Shea 14:

Michael P. O’Shea, Why Firearm Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 Yale L.J. Online 359 (2014), <http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism.>

The other, decentralizing approach envisions using the Constitution to promote autonomy in subnational jurisdictions by subjecting gun controls enacted by larger jurisdictions to more scrutiny than those enacted by smaller jurisdictions. There has been less scholarly discussion of this perspective.[11](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref11) When Heller was decided, I published an essay exploring the arguments for the decentralizing perspective.[12](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref12) I concluded: (1) because Americans are divided, **nationwide gun restrictions raise** special constitutional **concerns**,[13](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref13) and (2) to the extent it is proper to allow such concerns to influence constitutional analysis, **the** primary locus of subnational **authority to regulate guns should be the states**, not municipalities.[14](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref14)  **State firearms** preemption **statutes**, which bar municipalities from adopting piecemeal firearms restrictions, help to **preserve the integrity of state** approaches to gun policy **and uphold** the settlement implicit in **federalism**.[15](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref15) These statutes, I argued, are not merely consistent with a sound approach to decentralization, but rather form a crucial part of it. Firearm Localism takes up the decentralizing approach, enriching it with new observations and arguments. Blocher ultimately accepts the first conclusion but not the second. In his view, gun controls enacted by urban municipalities deserve “special deference” in constitutional analysis.[16](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref16) Broad state preemption laws, which prevent municipalities from adopting additional gun regulations, should be revised or repealed.[17](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref17) Thus, Blocher and I part ways in answering a critical question: if one seeks decentralization, then what is the lowest appropriate level of government for firearms policy?[18](http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-beats-firearm-localism" \l "_ftnref18) In this response, I defend and extend my position that the right answer is the state—not, as Blocher argues, the municipality. **A decentralized firearms policy** and gun-rights jurisprudence **should take the form** **of** a traditional, **state-based federalism**, for three reasons. First, firearm localism cannot be justified by a rural-urban divide on attitudes toward hunting, a practice that, although important, is peripheral to current gun control controversies. Second, firearm localism is not supported by traditional judicial approaches to the right to keep and bear arms. Finally, there is a strong pragmatic case against according deference to local firearm regulations. Firearm localism would destroy the compromise benefits of federalism by burdening the exercise of the right to keep and bear arms in ways that gun rights supporters would justifiably view as unacceptable.

#### Econ, decentralized governance is key to efficiency in the public and private sectors which is a necessary for economic stability, Inman 08:

**http://www.nber.org/papers/w13735.pdf**

A. Economic Efficiency: Federal governance is argued to promote efficiency in both the public and private sectors of the economy. First, multiple, lower tier governments allow mobile residents the opportunity to choose a preferred public goods bundle at the lowest cost. Choice 4 It is here that an economist would place the favorable outcome of “policy experimentation and innovation” so often stressed by U.S. courts; see Friedman (1997) or Rubin and Feeley (1994). 5 The Data Appendix provides the precise definition of each variable as well as the variable’s sample mean and standard deviation. 5 through mobility ensures a better matching of citizen preferences to government allocations (Tiebout, 1956) and serves as a disciplinary device to limit government inefficiency and corruption (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny,1993). Even if citizens are not mobile, **politically independent provinces** may **engage** **in efficiency**-enhancing “yardstick **competition**” **as citizens observe** what **their neighbors** are doing **and demand comparable service** or tax performances from their own elected leaders (Besley and Case, 1995).4 Decentralized governance does not come without its risks, however. Public “goods” with significant interjurisdictional spillovers may be underprovided while public “bads” may be overused; see, for example, Oates (1972). Such local spillovers can be corrected, but efficiently so only if local representatives to the central government do not fall prey to the mis-incentives of “common pool” budgeting of their mutual tax base; see Inman and Fitts (1990) and Besley and Coate (2003). **Federalism can contribute to the valued outcome of government efficiency**, but it is by no means guaranteed. Here I test for the potential ability of federal governance to promote public sector efficiency using two measures of government performance: 1) the average share over our sample period of Government Consumption spending in GDP (GC6589) measured by the share of total government spending less spending shares for defense, education, and social insurance; and 2) the average ranking during our sample period of each country’s government corruption score as provided by Transparency International (TICORRUPT). Higher values of both variables are meant to reflect less efficient government performance. 5 6 It has proven exceedingly difficult to find persuasive evidence for the effects of political institutions on economic growth. Growth rates are themselves very noisy measures of economic performance often more influenced by outside events – oil crises, world commodity prices – than country fundamentals. Further, as the arguments here for the effects of federalism make clear, institutions work through many economic channels and each channel itself can be a subtle path of influence. I did run growth regressions relating country growth rates from 1965 to 2000 to federal institutions controlling for various country fundamentals (available upon request) but found no significant effect of federal or democratic institutions on growth rates. This conclusion is consistent with the careful analysis in Tavares and Wacziarg (2001). In their work democracy promotes education which helps growth but stimulates income redistribution and inefficient government spending which discourage growth. In the end, democracy’s impact on growth is very small and slightly negative. 6 **Federalism** is also argued to **improve[s] private sector economic performance. Assigning** tax and regulatory **responsibilities** **to** provinces and **local governments** **checks** government’s **temptation** **to exploit** business **investment** through confiscatory capital taxes or excessive business regulation; see Weingast (1995). **Decentralized provision** of public goods **may encourage** a **more efficient allocation** of tax burdens over the life-cycle, thus promoting higher savings by younger workers and increased domestic capital accumulation; see Brueckner (2006) and Hatfield (2006). **Together**, tax and spending **decentralization encourage foreign and domestic investment**, capital accumulation, **economic growth, and** finally higher **steady-state incomes**. The potential long-run private sector economic benefits of federal institutions and policy decentralization are best measured by the level of a country’s income in a recent year; see Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004), and Rodrik (2006).6 For my measure of private sector economic performance I use the relative ranking in each of the sample country’s real output per worker (Y/L) in 1988 as presented in Hall and Jones (1999), where all values are relative to the United States. The U.S. ranking is 1.000 (this sample’s top score) while Myanmar has a relative score of .029 (this sample’s lowest score).

**And, economic downturn specifically harms minorities, who are more likely to become unemployed and have no means of supporting themselves, Taylor ’03:**  
Taylor 3 (Keelanga-Yamahtta, doctoral candidate in the department of African-American studies at Northwestern University) “Civil rights and civil wrongs: Racism in America today” International Socialist Review 03 Issue 32, November–December 2003   
Even at its historic low of 7.2 percent, **Black unemployment** still **was twice the unemployment level for whites.**9 These numbers did not take into account the nearly one million Black men locked up in prison and jail, which, by some estimates would increase the overall unemployment level by two percentage points.10 Moreover, since 2001, **when the economy officially went into recession**, official Black unemployment has drifted between 10 and 11 percent. An added result of the recession is that the drop in Black poverty rates, a result of the economic expansion of the 1990s, has been reversed and Black poverty is again on the rise. According to the Census Bureau, 24 percent of Blacks now live in poverty–up from 22 percent in 2001.11 Additionally, there was a 3 percent decrease in the Black median income.12. “**African Americans tend to be the last** to be **hired** when the economy is booming. **That means that they also tend to be the first to lose their jobs when a downturn hits**," according to Stephanie Armour writing in USA Today in December 2002. She goes on to say, "job losses have been deep in manufacturing and construction, they have also hit retailers, which lost 39,000 jobs in November. Jobs in those industries tend to be disproportionately held by African Americans…department store hiring was down by 17,000, the worst November for store hiring since 1982."13 In July 2003, the New York Times reported: Unemployment among Blacks is rising at a faster pace than in any similar period since the mid-1970s…nearly 2.6 million jobs have disappeared overall during the last 28 months… nearly 90 percent of those jobs were in manufacturing…with Blacks hit disproportionately harder than whites.14 The disproportionate impact of layoffs on African Americans in the recession of the early 1990s further illustrates how racism compounds an already bad situation when the economy begins to contract.

**Employers discriminate and there’s empirically verified causation – UChicago writes:**

“Racial Bias in Hiring” http://www.chicagobooth.edu/capideas/spring03/racialbias.html

In the study "Are Emily and Brendan More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?" Marianne Bertrand, an associate professor at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, and Sendhil Mullainathan of Massachusetts Institute of Technology use a field experiment to measure the extent of race-based job discrimination in the current labor market. From July 2001 to May 2002, Bertrand and Mullainathan sent fictitious resumes in response to 1,300 help-wanted ads listed in the *Boston Globe*and the *Chicago Tribune*. They used the callback rate for interviews to measure the success of each resume. Approximately 5,000 resumes were sent for positions in sales, administrative support, clerical services, and customer service. Jobs ranged from a cashier at a store to the manager of sales at a large firm. The catch was that the authors manipulated the perception of race via the name of each applicant, with comparable credentials for each racial group. Each resume was randomly assigned either a very white-sounding name (Emily Walsh, Brendan Baker) or a very African-American-sounding name (Lakisha Washington, Jamal Jones). The authors find that **applicants with white-sounding names are 50 percent more likely to get** called for **an** initial **interview than applicants with African-American-sounding names.** Applicants with white names need to send about 10 resumes to get one callback, whereas applicants with African-American names need to send about 15 resumes to achieve the same result. In addition, race greatly affects how much applicants benefit from having more experience and credentials. White job applicants with higher-quality resumes received 30 percent more callbacks than whites with lower-quality resumes. Having a higher-quality resume has a much smaller impact on [but] African-American applicants, who experienced only 9 percent more callbacks for the same improvement in their credentials.This disparity suggests that in the current state of the labor market, African-Americans may not have strong individual incentives to build better resumes. "For us, the most surprising and disheartening result is seeing that **applicants with African-American names were not rewarded for having better resumes**," says Bertrand. Statistically, the authors found that

### AC [2:00]

Flow these turns as an overview –

1. After a gun ban, the illegal market would immediately spring up due to low supply, ‘**Kates 82:**

Don B. Kates Jr (practices law with O'Brien and Hallisey in San Francisco), "Gun control versus gun prohibition," American Bar Association Journal, September 1982 AZ

Nor is there any reason to think that even a national prohibition could prevent the development of a illegal black market sufficient to serve both criminals and ordinary citizens. **If**, for instance, **handguns were smuggled** into his\* country **at the rate** at which federal officials estimate **marijuana is, more than 20 million [hand]guns** of the size used to kill John Lennon **could be imported** illegally **in a**ny **year.** (There are only 60 million legally owned handguns at present.) Moreover, **any competent machinist can build a revolver or** automatic **pistol** from pot metal for a fraction of what even the cheapest commercially produced handgun costs. Can it be doubted that **there would be thousands** of "entrepreneurs" **willing to build $15** junk **[handguns]** .45s and .38s **for** a 500 per cent profit at **illegal** black market **sale**? Of course, this type of gun would not fire more than a few hundred rounds and would be accurate only at close range. But that is adequate for a buyer who wants a gun only for murder, robbery, or self-defense.

The growth of the underground market would be so explosive that no legal measure could stop it – means you have no solvency and whites still get guns, **Cook et al ‘06:**

Philip J. Cook – professor at Duke University and NBER; Jens Ludwig – professor at Georgetown University and NBER ; Sudhir Venkatesh - professor at Columbia University; Anthony A. Braga – professor at Harvard University: “Underground Gun Markets” research was supported by a grant from the Joyce Foundation and written in part while Cook and Ludwig were resident fellows at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Study and Research Center; August 2, 2006 Don Terry – staff reporter, “How Criminals Get Their Guns: In Short, All Too Easily,” The New York Times, March 11, 1992, p. A1IG 12/16/15

**Underground gun markets** have **develop**ed in America **in response to regulations that** seek to **prohibit ownership** and possession by that sub-set of the population deemed to be at unacceptably high risk of misusing guns – primarily youth and adults with serious prior criminal records – while preserving easy access for everyone else. Whether 1 Most of what is known about the underground gun market comes from interviews with incarcerated prisoners or inner-city youth (for example Wright and Rossi, 1994, Webster et al., 2002, Sheley and Wright, 1993, Callahan and Rivara, 1992). However such interviews can at best shed light on how a subset of the retail market operates, and are not informative about other aspects of market structure or conduct. 3 the gun market can be segmented in this way remains the topic of spirited debate in U.S. policy circles. In Section 1 we review this regulatory system and note that a few jurisdictions, including Chicago, go further and essentially prohibit the private possession of handguns, the type of gun most commonly used in crime and violence. The fact that Chicago has unusually restrictive regulations makes the city an interesting case study. Economists and other skeptics like to point out that **government prohibitions** on transactions **are difficult to enforce**; the ingenuity of the marketplace, motivated by profit, will overcome whatever legal obstacles are put in place. **If true for handguns in Chicago**, then **we would expect to find** that youths and **criminals** are **able to acquire them with little trouble** (low transaction costs) at prices not that much higher from those in the legal market. As New York University law professor James Jacobs observes in this regard, “Some criminals claim that it is as easy to buy a gun on the streets as it is to buy fast food. **One Chicago gang member stated, ‘It’s like going through the drive-through** window. **Give me some fries, a Coke, and a 9-millimeter”** (2002, p. 150).2

2. The Substitution effect means that if handguns were banned criminals switching to deadlier weapons would just lead to more violence. This means that whites will just be even more dangerous in the aff world, **Kopel:**

**If handguns were** somehow **removed** from the hands of malfeasants, would the death toll actually increase? **Some** gun mis**users would switch to knives (not much less deadly than small handguns), while others would switch to rifles and shotguns (much more likely to kill than handguns).** If enough misusers switched from handguns to long guns, **the death toll might therefore increase, or so the "substitution argument" goes**. Dixon confronts the substitution argument carefully, and provides one of the most comprehensive critiques of substitution theory ever offered by a handgun prohibitionist. **\*327** Dixon is right to take the substitution argument seriously. **While handgun wounds are** usually **survivable**, especially if the victim gets medical attention quickly, **shotgun blasts** at close range **are** much more likely to be **fatal.** The shotgun fires a large slug, or from six to more than sixty pellets, with one trigger squeeze. A single shotgun pellet, because it may be of a diameter equal to a small handgun bullet, can inflict nearly as much damage as a small handgun bullet. [[177](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#177)] Wound ballistics and firearms experts concur that at short range, a shotgun is by far the deadliest weapon. [[178](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#178)] Anti-prohibition writers such as David Hardy, Gary Kleck, and Don Kates have argued that **a high level of substitution of long guns for handguns would occur in** the case of **a[n]** hypothetical **American handgun ban.** Dixon offers a careful rebuttal of their arguments, and concludes that (since he has placed the burden of proof on prohibition opponents) the case for a substitution effect has not been proven convincingly enough to overcome what he considers the strong evidence for handgun prohibition. Overlooked in the discussion of a substitution effect resulting from a hypothetical American handgun ban is non- hypothetical evidence from other countries. As Dixon showed earlier in his article, countries with more handguns per capita tend to have more handgun homicides per capita. [[179](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#179)] Switzerland, which has, by world standards, relatively lenient handgun laws, has more handgun homicides per capita than countries where handgun laws are tougher. [[180](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#180)] From the handgun density/handgun homicide correlation in Switzerland and other nations (as well as from other evidence detailed supra), Dixon concludes that handgun density strictly correlates with handgun homicide. [[181](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#181)] Let us **\*328** assume that Dixon is right. **In countries** such as Australia and Canada, **where handgun laws are** much **stricter** than in Switzerland, **the handgun homicide rate is lower** than in Switzerland, **but the total homicide rate is over 100 percent greater.** [[182](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#182)] The reason cannot be that Australians and Canadians are more prone to want to kill somebody than the Swiss are - Dixon has explicitly assumed that human nature in developed countries is roughly similar everywhere. [[183](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#183)] So why then do Canada and Australia have more murders, even though they have stricter handgun laws, and fewer handgun murders? One plausible explanation is the substitution effect. A sufficiently large number of Australians and Canadians, unable to obtain handguns, do their shooting with rifles or shotguns; their victims die, whereas if they had been shot with handguns, many would have survived. Although some Australian and Canadian assailants, unable to obtain handguns, switched to less deadly weapons (such as clubs), the number of assailants who switched to rifles and shotguns was sufficiently large to increase the overall death toll. If we have plausible evidence to suggest that a substitution effect may have occurred in Australia and Canada, could a similar effect occur in the United States? [[184](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#184)] **\*329** Dixon quotes research developed by Don Kates and Mark Benenson that if 30% of persons attempting homicide switched from handguns to long guns, while the other 70% switched to knives, total homicide would increase substantially. If 50% switched to long guns, the homicide rate could double, even if none of the persons switching to knives killed anyone. [[185](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#185)] **A National** Institute of Justice **study of felons** in state prisons **found that 72% of the handgun criminals said they would switch to sawed-off shotguns if handguns became unavailable.** [[186](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#186)] A 72% substitution rate would lead to an enormous multiplication of the current homicide rate, and Kleck expects that substitution would occur at about 70%. Dixon retorts that criminals are apt to be braggarts and liars, and might claim that nothing, including a handgun ban, could stop them from committing any crime they chose. Accordingly, the 72% substitution figure might be too high. True enough. But at the same time, at least some criminals may be highly suspicious and mistrustful of authority. Although the National Institute of Justice polling, conducted through written response to written questions, offered the respondents anonymity, some of the prisoners might have believed that their responses would not in fact be anonymous; the polling might be a "setup" to discern their plans after release, and provide a reason for denying parole. Thus, some handgun criminals might have falsely said that they would not substitute sawed-off shotguns for unavailable handguns. Do the number of braggart criminals who falsely said that they would use sawed-off shotguns outnumber the number of mistrustful criminals who falsely said they would not? It is difficult to say with certainty. But since 72% of the criminals said they would substitute, and since only 30% substitution is needed to increase substantially the homicide rate, there is a wide margin for error to assume that bragging criminals outnumber suspicious ones. Dixon critiques the Benenson and Kates estimate of a homicide rate increase because Benenson and Kates assumed that handgun users who did not switch to long guns would switch "downward" to the next most deadly weapon, knives. Almost certainly, some handgun users would, rather than using knives, turn to even less deadly weapons, such as fists, or would not attempt murder in the first place, absent a handgun. [[187](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#187)] But when calculating expected deaths resulting from substitution, Kates and Benenson assumed that none of the persons who switched to knives would kill anyone; in terms of resulting deaths, therefore, Kates and Benenson underestimated the **\*330** deaths that would be caused by murderers who switched downward to less lethal weapons. Even assuming that none of the persons who switched down killed anyone, the homicide rate would double if half of the handgun-deprived criminals switched "up" to long guns. [[188](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#188)] Another tack taken by Dixon is to argue that high rates of substitution are unlikely because long guns are so inferior for most criminal purposes. He notes first of all that less than 10% of murders are currently perpetrated with long guns. [[189](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#189)] This is true, but, as Dixon strenuously argues, handguns are widely preferred as murder weapons, and widely available. Thus, it should not be surprising that more than 6 out of 7 gun murderers chose the "best" tool, a handgun. But what people choose when the "best" option is available does not prove how they would behave if only inferior options were available. Today, virtually all hard liquor drinkers consume the "best" hard liquor available - namely legally-produced hard liquor whose production is regulated by the government to guarantee standards of safety. Probably less than 5% of American hard liquor consumers drink bathtub gin, moonshine, and other home- brewed liquors whose safety cannot be guaranteed. Does the fact prove that very few liquor drinkers would, if legal liquor became unavailable, substitute home-brewed liquor? To the contrary, the experience of alcohol prohibition showed that a large percentage of liquor consumers, if unable to obtain safe, legal liquor, will switch to inferior, dangerous homemade liquor. [[190](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#190)] **That murderers** only **rarely use long guns today does not prove that murders would eschew long guns if handguns were unavailable**, any more than drinkers of legal liquor would eschew bathtub gin. [[191](http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/lrstlupl.htm#191)] As another argument against substitution, Dixon points out that long guns are less concealable than handguns. Even when sawed off, a shotgun is still about 11 inches long, making it slightly larger than big handguns, and much larger than the small, low-caliber handguns which are frequently used in crime. Would sawed-off shotguns frequently be substituted in a **\*331** robberies? Putting an 11 inch shotgun in one's front pocket would not be very effective concealment. On the other hand, sticking the shotgun in the inner pocket of a large coat or jacket would seem reasonably effective.

#### 3. White Republican Backlash [0:35]

Gun control, regardless of its consequences or solvency, will always be perceived negatively and spun as right wing propaganda, fueling animosity, **Guardian ’13:**

**The number of anti-government, far-right extremist groups has soared to record levels** since 2008 and they are becoming increasingly militant, according to a report by the Southern Poverty Law Center. It says the number of groups in the "Patriot" movement stood at 1,360 in 2012, up from 149 in 2008 when Barack Obama was first elected president, an increase of 813%. The report said the rise was **driven by opposition to** Obama and the "spluttering rage" over **federal** attempts at **gun control**. Those who were identified as "militia" groups or the paramilitary wing of the Patriot movement, numbered 321, up from 42 in 2008, the SPLC said in its report. Concern over a "truly explosive growth" of groups on the radical right, along with a rise in domestic terrorist plots, has prompted the SPLC to write to US attorney general Eric Holder and Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano, warning of the potential for domestic terrorism and urging them create a new, inter-agency task force to assess whether it has adequate resources to deal with it. The stories you need to read, in one handy email Read more The report says that the numbers far exceed the "high-water mark" of 820 groups in 1990s when the rise in militias was fuelled by the Waco siege, the Brady Bill and the 1994 assault weapons ban. Richard Cohen, the SPLC president and a member of the Department of Homeland Security's group to counter violent extremism, wrote in the letter: "On October 25, 1994, six months before the Oklahoma City bombing, we wrote attorney general Janet Reno about the growing threat of domestic extremism. Today we write to express similar concerns. "As in the period before the Oklahoma City bombing, we now are seeing ominous threats from those who believe that the government is poised to take their guns." Timothy McVeigh drove a truck full of explosives into a federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, killing 168 people, 19 of them children under six, and injured hundreds more. "**We are seeing a** real and **rising threat of domestic terrorism as the number of far-right anti-government groups continues to grow** at an astounding pace," said Mark Potok, SPLC senior fellow and author of the report. "It is critically important that the country take this threat seriously. The potential for deadly violence is real, and clearly rising." Potok said that the demographic factors driving the rise in such groups began before Obama became president – the census bureau predicts that whites will become a minority group in the US by 2043 – but have been fuelled by the changes in America he represents. The growth in extremism has been helped by the "successful exploitation over illegal immigration" and by anger over the gun control debate, he said. Law enforcement **officials have uncovered numerous terrorism conspiracies** born in the militia subculture, **including plots to spread poison**ous ricin powder, to attack federal installations, **and** to **murder federal judges** and other government officials, the report says. Potok cited a study by the Combating Terrorism Center at the West Point military academy, which found that right-wing violence in 2000-2011 surpassed that of the 1990s by a factor of four. He expected extremism to rise, as **anger over gun control had become a "grassroots rebellion".** He said that **20 states are considering laws that would** aim to **nullify federal gun control measures and 500 sheriffs** mainly in western US, who **say they will not enforce any such measures**. Daryl Johnson, a former Department of Homeland Security official, said in a press call that SPLC's numbers were likely to be a "on the conservative end" because they did not include clandestine and underground groups which did not have a presence on the internet. Johnson, who was a member of the now-disbanded non-Islamic terrorism unit at the Department of Homeland Security, authored a report in 2009 warning about the increasing dangers of right-wing extremism which created a political firestorm, and was later withdrawn. He said it was "quite unsettling" that nothing had changed at the DHS in the last four years despite the rise in extremism. Although only a small pool of individuals associated with such groups were potentially violent, and radicalisation was difficult to analyse, Johnson said: "This pool of potentially violent extremists should raise a red flag of concern." He urged FBI and local law enforcement officials to assess the threat, and said more analysis was needed. The SPLC's report on hate and extremism, contained in its quarterly intelligence report, also found that hate groups remained at a near-record level of 1,007 groups in 2012, a slight drop from the 1,018 groups documented in 2011. SLPC defined "Patriot" groups as those who believe that the federal government is engaged in a conspiracy, is prepared to engage in martial law, would take away guns and would force the US into some kind of so-called "One World Nation".

Multiple implications that turn the aff and prove no solvency **A.** you only feed into redneck anger that increases the intensity of the gun culture you criticize **B.** empirically validated that backlash will inspire further violence in acts of resistance and **C.** local law enforcement literally won’t follow through with the aff, so the aff doesn’t fix anything.

1. Speice, Patrick [Wake Forest University], Lyle, Jim [Debate Coach, Clarion University] “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever” (2003) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)